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ABSTRACT
This paper aimed to investigate information disclosure on business combination transactions that took place in Brazil in 2010, when the 
Accounting Standard CPC 15 entered into force, and evaluate which were the determining factors of the level of disclosure of information 
related to it. To evaluate the disclosure level, a disclosure index of business combinations (INDCOMB) was prepared, having the disclosure 
index developed by Shalev (2009) as a basis. We evaluated, in the light of the literature on disclosure and business combinations, whether 
the following factors influenced on the disclosure level: acquiring company size, recognized percentage of overprice for expected future 
profitability in relation to the transaction value, dispersion of capital of the acquiring company, audit firm size, and participation of the 
acquiring company in American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) programs. The control variables used were listing of the acquiring company 
in the various segments of BM&FBOVESPA, operation sector, origin (state, private company with national capital or private company with 
foreign capital), and relative acquired company size in relation to the acquiring company. We analyzed business combination transactions 
that took place in 2010, reported by 40 open capital companies involved in 76 transactions. We conclude that the audit firm size and the 
relative acquired company size were factors that influenced on the level of disclosure of information regarding business combinations in 
2010. The other factors showed no conclusive results.
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 1 INTRODUCTION
fied the situation that may occur in the economy consi-
dering half of the business ideas as “good” and the other 
half as “bad”. Investors and entrepreneurs act rationally 
and evaluate an investment having the information they 
hold as a basis. If investors cannot distinguish betwe-
en “good” and “bad” business ideas, then, entrepreneurs 
with “bad” business ideas might argue that their busi-
ness ideas are “good”. Therefore, investors might evalu-
ate investments at a medium level. As a result, if the in-
formation asymmetry problem is not solved, the capital 
market may underestimate the value of good ideas and 
overestimate the value of some bad ideas. To tackle such 
a problem, Healy and Palepu (2001) point out some so-
lutions. The first could be optimizing contracts betwe-
en entrepreneurs and investors, creating incentives for 
a full disclosure of private information, thus mitigating 
the issue of investment measurement errors. Another 
might be regulation, which could require a full disclosu-
re of private information from professional administra-
tors. And, also, a third way might be getting information 
from intermediaries, such as market analysts and rating 
agencies, which seek to unravel the information held by 
administrators. 
In Brazil, the disclosure of information on incorpo-
ration, merger, or demerger is required by Instruction 
319, from the Brazilian Securities Commission (CVM), 
enacted on December 1999. Alternatively, Instruction 
CVM 358, enacted in 2002, provides for the disclosure of 
information on any relevant act or fact concerning open 
capital companies, among which stands out the trans-
fer of control. It also establishes the obligation to inform 
the names of the acquiring and acquired companies, a 
brief summary of the acquiring company’s qualification, 
its business sectors and its activities. It also requires the 
disclosure of price and other conditions regarding the 
deal, such as the acquisition purpose and the expected 
effects on the acquiring company’s businesses. It was, 
however, with the entry into force of the Accounting 
Standard 15, from the Brazilian Accounting Pronoun-
cements Committee (CPC), which established a robust 
set of information subject to compulsory disclosure on 
the part of open capital companies involved in business 
combination transactions. 
Information disclosure plays a significant role by re-
ducing the information asymmetry between the company 
and its shareholders, but there are costs to the company 
associated with the production and dissemination of such 
information. A component of this expense is ownership 
cost, related to the company’s expenditure due to strategic 
information disclosure. Such information may be used by 
competitors, for instance, at the company’s expense. Thus, 
companies assess the costs and benefits of information 
disclosure, even those related to mandatory disclosure 
information (Dye, 2001; Robinson, Xue, & Yu, 2011; Ver-
recchia, 2001). 
Business combination is a transaction where a com-
pany acquires control over one or more businesses, regar-
dless of the legal form of the transaction, which may be 
by means of merger or acquisition of control. It arouses 
great interest in business circles, because, in addition to 
the large figures involved, there is an impact on decisions 
taken by customers, suppliers, and employees associa-
ted with these companies. It also raises expectations in 
the stock market and interest in the academy. In order to 
think of the magnitude of this kind of transaction, the sale 
of control over State enterprises earned the Brazilian go-
vernment the figure of US$ 105.298 billion, out of which 
US$ 78,614 billion only during the Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso administration. 
There is not, yet, a firmly established theory suppor-
ting the motivations for the occurrence of business com-
bination. However, there are a number of explanations 
for the occurrence of these transactions, especially tho-
se derived from the Theory of the Firm (Camargos & 
Coutinho, 2008), which has in its theoretical framework 
a logical explanation for the emergence of the firm, its 
evolution, its growth, and, from this growth perspective, 
business combination activities are shaped. In the early 
development stage of the firm, the businessman had full 
power to decide on business issues. The businessman was 
both the business owner and administrator. As the com-
pany grew, manager-owners started playing a wider range 
of activities, they were forced to share or even delegate 
powers so that a professional administrator with more 
specialized knowledge and managerial ability, could take 
management positions and make decisions. Besides the 
administrative complexity that required hiring profes-
sional administrators to control the firm, financial cons-
traints due to growing demands have forced companies to 
go public, dividing their property among a large number 
of shareholders. This resulted in the separation of com-
pany ownership and control. 
As a consequence of the separation of ownership 
and control, conflicts between owners (the firm’s sha-
reholders) and professional administrators (those who 
assumed control) emerged, since both seek to maximize 
their own interests, which do not always coincide. When 
the owner-shareholders invest their money in a firm, 
they are at risk of being expropriated by professional ad-
ministrators, such as, for instance, when the latter provi-
de themselves with excessive privileges, receive excessive 
compensation, or make investments or operational deci-
sions that can cause damage to the owners’ interests (He-
aly & Palepu, 2001). Due to the fact that owners are not 
directly involved in administration, and this function is 
performed by professional administrators, it is reasona-
ble to suppose that the latter have more information on 
the firm than its owners. This information asymmetry 
situation can lead to a collapse of the capital market due 
to adverse selection. Healy and Palepu (2001) exempli-
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Although CVM requires the disclosure of information 
on transactions regarding merger and demerger since Ins-
truction CVM 319 was enacted in 1999, and despite the 
requirement of information disclosure concerning the 
transfer of control since Instruction CVM 358 was enac-
ted, in 2002, there is no data confirming the existence of 
an index demonstrating the information disclosure level 
required from then on. Thus, this study aims to evaluate, 
by constructing a disclosure index (INDCOMB), based on 
the information required by the Accounting Standard CPC 
15, the level of disclosure of information related to business 
combinations that took place in 2010. By using the index 
INDCOMB, this study seeks to answer the following rese-
arch question: “Since the entry into force of the Accounting 
Standard CPC 15 - Business Combinations -, containing 
compulsory rules for disclosure of information on business 
combinations, which factors do influence the information 
disclosure level in transactions?”. 
This study aims to find evidence of the factors influen-
cing on the company’s decision to disclose a greater or les-
ser amount of information on business combination tran-
sactions. 
It is hoped that this study can contribute so that 
users, regulators, and preparers of financial statements 
apprehend the mechanisms associated with the level of 
disclosure of information on these significant business 
combinations. 
In addition to this brief introduction, which sought to 
contextualize the problem, this paper is divided into the 
following sections: section 2 reviews the surveys relating 
the disclosure level to the company’s characteristics, whi-
ch are used to ground the research hypotheses. Section 
3 describes the methodology employed, the empirical 
model, the way how the disclosure index INDCOMB was 
constructed, and the information sources. Section 4 pre-
sents the results and, finally, our conclusions are drawn.
 2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND CONSTRUCTION OF HYPOTHESES
 2.1 Disclosure and business combination
Merger and acquisition transactions constitute the 
fastest way to grow a company, enter into markets whe-
re it is not operating, yet, fight against unwanted acqui-
sitions, take advantage of investment opportunities or, 
even, to lead some participants in these processes to pro-
fit at the expense of others (Camargos & Barbosa, 2003). 
As it is an transaction that significantly affects the inte-
rests of shareholders, the disclosure of information related 
to these transactions plays an important role in reducing 
information asymmetry between the company’s adminis-
tration and its shareholders. 
According to Shalev (2009), the administrators tend to 
disclose more information on acquisitions that are expec-
ted to create value for the acquiring company (good news) 
and disclose less information on acquisitions that are less 
likely to be profitable (bad news). 
According to Healy and Palepu (2001), the problem of 
information asymmetry causes the phenomenon of adver-
se selection, i.e. as it is not possible to distinguish good in-
vestments from bad investments, the market evaluates in-
vestments by an average level, hindering the development 
of this market. 
To tackle this problem, Healy and Palepu (2001) 
point out two solutions. The first might be optimizing 
contracts between entrepreneurs and investors, leading 
them to promote full disclosure of private information, 
thus mitigating the issue of error in investment evalua-
tion. The second is regulation, which might require full 
disclosure of private information from professional ad-
ministrators. 
On the other hand, the company may judge that the 
disclosure of information related to business combination 
may entail high costs to owners, something which could 
lead them to restrict or even reduce the disclosure level. In 
such a situation, the disclosure of information on business 
transactions should be compulsory. 
According to Dye (2001), there is not yet an establi-
shed theory on mandatory disclosure, in part because 
few analytical investigations were conducted to address 
accounting standards in the previous two decades. Schi-
pper (2007) confirms this, and also argues that theorists 
cannot agree on what should be optimized in terms of 
disclosure requirements. Furthermore, the theoretical 
models also face difficulties in distinguishing between 
items recognized in the financial statements and those 
disclosed only in the notes. 
In economic terms, the underlying idea to disclo-
sure regulation is that companies do not voluntarily 
open the information when the cost is greater than the 
effects produced by it on firm value (Verrecchia, 2001). 
Thus, the regulation could make compulsory the dis-
closure of information that would not be disclosed on a 
voluntary basis, although it is noticed that mandatory 
disclosure does not necessarily indicate that all infor-
mation is disclosed, as documented by other surveys 
indicating a low level of disclosure of mandatory in-
formation (Ayers, Schwab, & Utke, no prelo; Devalle & 
Rizzato, 2012). 
Despite this fact, among the reasons for the exis-
tence of regulation, there is the idea that accounting 
information may be seen as a public good (Leftwich, 
1980). A second explanation for disclosure regulation 
is the concern of regulators with unsophisticated inves-
tors (Leftwich, 1980). Ensuring minimum compulsory 
disclosure, regulation seeks to reduce the gap of infor-
mation between informed and uninformed investors. 
Regulation may be a way to reduce the possibility of 
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manipulation of accounting figures, but it might also 
be biased. According to Martins and Iudicibus (2011, 
p. 72):
[...] regardless of how good the regulators’ purposes are, 
there are always political aspects involved favoring some 
groups and damaging others.
It is known that, on the other hand, absolute Accounting 
neutrality is unattainable, because choices are always 
made.
 2.2 Disclosure and the company’s characteristics 
According to Ahmed and Courtis (1999), the typical 
methodology employed in surveys relating the disclosu-
re level to the company’s characteristics is that involving 
the construction of an index and the ratio between the 
amount of informational items disclosed and the selected 
corporate characteristics. In this study, we sought to de-
termine whether the acquiring company’s characteristics 
(size, control structure, and listing on foreign stock ex-
changes), as well as the percentage of recognition of goo-
dwill in relation to the value of transferred consideration 
and the audit firm size influenced the level of disclosure 
on the business combination transaction. 
In the meta-analysis of surveys on disclosure car-
ried out by Ahmed and Courtis (1999), the most fre-
quent variable when relating the disclosure level to the 
company’s characteristics was its size. According to 
Ahmed and Courtis (1999), several studies (Singhvi  & 
Desai, 1971; Cooke, 1989) found out a positive relation 
between disclosure and firm size. According to the au-
thors, the results suggest that larger firms had better dis-
closure level. There are several hypotheses that explain 
the positive relation between disclosure and size, among 
which those raised by Singhvi and Desai (1971), arguing 
that the larger the firm size, measured by total assets, 
the higher the disclosure, due to the fact that the cost to 
generate information is relatively lower for larger com-
panies. In addition, Wallace and Naser (1995) also argue 
that larger companies typically attract more customers, 
suppliers, and analysts, and, therefore, a greater demand 
for more information on their activities. In a survey with 
a sample of 130 companies from Hong Kong within the 
period from 1988 to 1992, these authors also found a 
positive relation between size and the level of disclosure 
of mandatory information. 
However, Street and Bryant (2000), Glaum and Street 
(2003), and Street and Gray (2002) found no evidence that 
firm size has a positive relation to the level of compliance 
with the requirements of international standards. 
In Brazil, Murcia and Santos (2009) analyzed the vo-
luntary information disclosure contained in the Brazilian 
Standardized Financial Statements (DFP) for the fiscal 
year 2007 of the 100 largest Brazilian non-financial open 
capital companies. These authors found that company 
size is positively related to the information disclosure 
level and the results corroborate the idea that larger fir-
ms, due to their greater visibility in society, have a wider 
group of interested people following up its performance. 
Thus, being more transparent, they increase their repu-
tation with this audience and suffer less pressure. 
Based on the evidence found in the surveys cited, it is 
possible to formulate the following hypothesis:
H1: The disclosure level of business combinations has 
a positive correlation to the acquiring company size.
Accounting considers the acquired goodwill as wa-
ste, it is addressed as the difference between the value 
attributed to business and the net value of assets and 
liabilities measured at fair value. Therefore, goodwill 
includes non-identifiable intangible assets, future pro-
fitability, and, occasionally, overpricing. If a significant 
portion of the value attributed to business is recognized 
as goodwill, it may be a sign that the acquiring com-
pany paid more than the acquired company is worth, 
according to market assessment, and it may not be inte-
resting to have a high level of disclosure of information 
on the transaction. Shalev (2007) identified two phe-
nomena in business combination that might encourage 
administrators to use the materiality criterion to redu-
ce the level of disclosure of information on the tran-
saction, namely, transaction overprice and distorted 
allocation in transaction value, overestimating the va-
lue of recognized goodwill. Overprice may be motiva-
ted by the entry into a new market where the acquiring 
company has no operations or as a way to increase its 
market share or also by miscalculation. But it may also 
be due to overconfidence or even arrogance on the part 
of the acquiring company’s administrator. It is worth 
emphasizing, therefore, that the value the acquiring 
company assigns to business may be different than the 
average market assessment. This may take place due to 
various reasons and only the acquiring company kno-
ws them. Without ignoring the possibility that the deal 
has some managerial motivation, the company could 
enter into business only if advantages are expected in 
the best sense of optimizing its wealth. According to 
Shalev (2007), it is possible that overpricing leads to 
an exaggerated recognition of goodwill value. The in-
tentional and distorted recognition of goodwill value, 
according to Shalev (2007), is the belief that investors 
have in the functional attachment of profit. Thus, the 
systematic amortization of goodwill is no longer allo-
wed by the U.S. accounting standards, the transaction 
could result in an increased income reported by the 
combination and it might be an incentive for managers 
to recognize a distorted goodwill value. Shalev (2007) 
found that disclosure is lower as the portion of the 
transaction amount recognized as goodwill in relation 
to the value of the transaction is higher. According to 
Shalev (2007), when the acquirer pays a lot more than 
the acquired company is worth or when the goodwill 
value is “exaggerated” in relation to the transaction va-
lue, the acquirer tends to disclose less information on 
the business combination. The goodwill, besides being 
no longer systematically amortized in accounting ter-
ms may be deducted from income tax in Brazil, under 
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certain conditions1, something which may encourage 
administrators to recognize a substantial portion of 
the transaction value as goodwill. Taking into account, 
therefore, that it would not be interesting for managers 
to reveal overpricing or distorted recognition of the 
goodwill value, considered as “bad news”, the hypothe-
sis posed is:
H2: The disclosure level of a business combination 
has a negative correlation to the ratio between the recog-
nized goodwill and the transferred consideration value.
According to the agency theory, the separation of ow-
nership and control has led to the emergence of agency 
conflict. This is also derived from the separation of firm 
ownership and control and due to the fact that agents are 
engaged in its operation, they have more information than 
investors, resulting in information asymmetry among 
stakeholders. Shleiffer and Vishny (1986) found that the 
interests of the controlling shareholders do not necessari-
ly coincide with those of other investors in the company. 
The presence of big shareholders may end up generating 
conflict between controlling and non-controlling sha-
reholders, there is a possibility that the latter are expro-
priated by the former. This possibility may be due, for 
instance, to the inefficiency resulting from the pursuit of 
personal objectives that do not optimize the company’s 
value. The expropriation of non-controlling shareholders 
by the controlling shareholders may take place, according 
to Lanzana (2004), by the appointment of individuals con-
nected to the controller to manage the company, the va-
luation of investments based on the controller’s personal 
interest, among others reasons. As the fact that the con-
trolling shareholder has privileged access to information 
would not require information disclosure (Leuz & Ver-
recchia, 2000), it is expected that companies with more 
dispersed ownership capital disclose more information 
than those controlled by major shareholders (Raffournier, 
1995; Wallace & Naser, 1995). The hypothesis formulated 
having theory as a basis is:
H3: The disclosure level of a business combination 
has a positive correlation to the dispersion of capital.
Audit services are demanded as monitoring tools 
against the potential conflict of interest between com-
pany owners and administrators, as well as between the 
various classes of shareholders, according to Deangelo 
(1981). Audited financial statements could be the chea-
pest solution to agency conflicts. Audit quality is related 
to auditor’s independence from its client. According to 
Deangelo (1981), the higher the audit firm in relation to 
the current number of customers and the smaller the firm 
in relation to its revenue, less incentive the auditor might 
have to act on a timely basis and the greater might be the 
perceived audit quality. Large audit firms, the so-called 
“Big Four” (KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte 
Touche Tohmatsu, and Ernest & Young), tend not to asso-
ciate with companies having low disclosure level (Ahmad, 
Hassan, & Mohammad, 2003). Dumontier and Raffour-
nier (1998) also argue that auditors from the largest com-
panies have an interest of their own in seeing clients in 
accordance with complex accounting standards, because 
they can enhance their reputation and take competitive 
advantage in the application of international accounting 
standards. Murcia and Santos (2009), in a survey on the 
determinants of voluntary disclosure level in the financial 
statements for the years 2006, 2007, and 2008 of Brazilian 
open capital companies, found evidence that companies 
audited by the “Big Four” had higher disclosure of eco-
nomic information. On the other hand, Wallace and Na-
ser (1995) found no relation between the mandatory dis-
closure level and this variable in their research with 130 
companies from Hong Kong. It is assumed that the largest 
audit firms, by having international experience in the use 
of these rules on disclosure of business combination tran-
sactions, are more prepared than their local counterparts 
to certify disclosure. Thus, the following research hypo-
thesis is formulated:
H4: The disclosure level of a business combination 
has a positive correlation to the audit firm size.
An alternative to raise funds for Brazilian open ca-
pital companies is resorting to international markets. 
By means of the American Depositary Receipts (ADRs), 
Brazilian companies have the possibility to trade their 
securities in the United States, the largest capital market 
in the world. According to Lanzana (2004), the possi-
bility that Brazilian companies issue ADRs, or debt se-
curities in the U.S. market, has required a greater infor-
mation disclosure level from these companies than that 
required by the Brazilian law. According to Leuz and 
Wysocki (2008), the U.S. securities legislation protects 
the rights of foreigner investors more than in their own 
countries of origin, and these rights are more strictly re-
quired both by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) and the U.S. courts on security litigation. When 
listing their securities on U.S. stock exchanges,  foreign 
companies are subject to their laws and their respective 
enforcement. The disclosure policy of a company tends 
to be influenced by the disclosure policy of the capital 
market where its securities are traded, according to Ar-
chambault and Archambault (2003). Murcia and Santos 
(2009) analyzed the determining factors of the voluntary 
disclosure level of the 100 largest non-financial Brazilian 
open capital companies traded on the basis of financial 
statement analysis for the fiscal year 2007. The authors 
found a positive correlation between the disclosure and 
participation level of the company in an ADR program 
levels II and III. Based on theory and evidence of the 
cited studies, it is possible to formulate the following hy-
pothesis:
H5: The disclosure level of a business combination 
transaction has a positive correlation to the company’s 
participation in ADR programs. 
1 The amortization of goodwill for future profitability has no effects on the calculation of income tax, as provided for by Article 25 of Decree-Law 1,598. However, Article 7 of Law 9,532, enacted on December 10, 
1997, provides for the amortization of goodwill for future profitability, impacting, therefore, on the calculation of income tax if a company absorbs the assets of another in virtue of merger or demerger, in a 
situation where it had already acquired stake in goodwill.
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 2.3 Disclosure index
Financial information disclosure is an important means 
of communication between the company administration 
and investors and the other market participants. The de-
mand for disclosure derives from the issue of information 
asymmetry and agency conflicts between administrators 
and investors (Healy & Palepu, 2001). An indirect way to 
measure disclosure is by constructing an index based on 
observable variables related to disclosure. Observable as-
pects may be both objective, having a numerical quantifica-
tion, and subjective, related to information quality. So, this 
index shows the disclosure level of a group of companies, 
which may be used to show the compliance with standards 
if the items making up the index are required or it can de-
monstrate the voluntary disclosure level. When the resear-
cher uses a disclosure index his research, he may choose to 
use an index that already exists or construct his own index. 
By using already existing disclosure indexes, the researcher 
has the advantage of making direct comparisons of his re-
search to previous studies (Marston & Shrives, 1991) and 
he also has the benefit of saving survey time, but restricts 
himself to pre-defined items, without having the flexibility 
to add or remove items as he deems needed in his survey. 
The current indexes may be the ranking of the Center for 
International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR), 
the Association for Investiment and Management Re-
port (AIMR), and the transparency indicator of Standard 
& Poors. In Brazil, there are the transparency rankings 
of the Brazilian Association of Open Capital Companies 
(ABRASCA) and the award of the National Association of 
Finance Executives (ANEFAC). 
With the option to construct an index of his own, the 
researcher deems more appropriate to choose items suita-
ble to the context of his survey. Then, items making up the 
index are chosen among those that the researcher consi-
ders as related to disclosure. Although they may be sub-
ject to criticism and disagreement, like any other research 
tool in social sciences, disclosure rates have been used 
since the 1960s by many researchers. The disclosure index 
provides the answers to researchers’ hypotheses in many 
situations, confirming its usefulness, since a research tool 
would not be used by providing poor results (Marston & 
Shrives, 1991). 
The Brazilian literature has many studies addressing 
information disclosure, such as Costa Jr. (2003), Malacri-
da and Yamamoto (2006), Salotti and Yamamoto (2008) 
and Lima (2009). Regarding the disclosure index, we may 
cite Lopes and Rodrigues (2007), who used a disclosure 
index based on the information required by the interna-
tional accounting standards to analyze the determining 
factors of disclosure for companies listed on the Portu-
guese stock exchange. Mapurunga, Rocha, Ponte, Coelho 
and Meneses (2011) used a disclosure index based on 
CPC 14, which deals with financial instruments, to che-
ck the disclosure level of Brazilian companies. Malaquias, 
Lemes, Carvalho and Tavares (2012) investigated the cor-
relation between the capital cost of Brazilian companies 
and the level of disclosure of information on financial 
instruments that these companies report on the form 20F 
and the financial statements prepared and disclosed in ac-
cordance with the accounting practices adopted in Brazil.
2.3.1 Disclosure Index of Business Combination 
(INDCOMB)
This study aims to analyze the mandatory disclosure of 
information on business combination in accordance with 
CPC 15. The existing rankings and indicators on disclosure 
in Brazil have a general nature, they do not focus on the 
disclosure of a specific information type. Although CVM 
requires disclosure on incorporation, merger, and demer-
ger transactions since Instruction CVM 319 was enacted, 
in 1996, and despite the requirement of disclosure in the 
transfer of control since the enactment of Instruction CVM 
358, in 2002, there is no knowledge of an index demonstra-
ting the level of information disclosure specifically regar-
ding these transactions. Thus, we chose to prepare a disclo-
sure index addressing business combination (INDCOMB) 
transactions, adapted from disclosure index developed by 
Shalev (2009), which was based on business combination 
information required by the U.S. accounting standards2. 
When preparing INDCOMB, we used the information re-
quired by the Accounting Standard CPC 15.  
We chose the content analysis technique to analyze the 
information contained in the DFPs submitted by compa-
nies to CVM. In order to ensure a rather objective and 
systematic analysis of information and reduce subjectivi-
ty, the information required by CPC 15 were classified and 
grouped according to theme addressed into 10 categories 
and 65 subcategories: General Information (12) Informa-
tion on the allocation of purchase price (7), Information 
on contingent consideration agreement (4), information 
on contingent liabilities (5), Information on goodwill (13), 
Information on transactions recognized separately from 
combination (7), Information on business combination 
achieved in stages (3), Financial information on the acqui-
red company included in the consolidated statements (4), 
Information on business combinations whose acquisition 
date was after the end of the reporting period (3), Informa-
tion on changes that took place in the acquired assets, and 
liabilities taken within the reporting period (7). 
2 The items required by SFAS 141, reviewed in December 2007, are similar to IFRS-3 (r), from 2009. The information required by SFAS 141, from 2001, are not the same as SFAS 141, reviewed in 2007. 
 3 METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS
 3.1 Definition of information categories and 
subcategories 
In this article, we chose to assign binary values  to each 
information item required, assigning the value “1” if the 
company disclosed the required information (1), or “0” if it 
did not disclose the information (0), as adopted by several 
surveys on disclosure (see, for instance, Botosan, 1997; De-
valle & Rizzato, 2012; Shalev, 2009; Yeoh, 2005). Although 
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there are surveys where values  are set according to the spe-
cificity degree of each information item (see, for instance, 
Lanzana, 2004; Wiseman, 1982), it is believed that this way 
of assigning value establishes a certain subjectivity degree 
not desirable to the survey. 
When the notes had no mention to a certain informa-
tional item, it was assumed that the item did not apply 
to the case. However, if after reading the whole financial 
statement it was concluded that the item was significant 
but it was not disclosed, “0” is assigned to that infor-
mational item. This procedure introduces a subjectivi-
ty element, but it was understood that this procedure 
introduced a smaller bias than simply considering the 
dichotomous condition “disclosed/did not disclose” in-
formation. That was the way of assigning value used by 
Cooke (1989). 
The disclosure index may be understood as the com-
pliance level, because these items are of compulsory dis-
closure. Just as found by Hodgdon, Tondkar, Harless and 
Adhikari (2008), even companies that have claimed to 
adopt the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) in 1999 and 2000 did not do that adequately. In 
addition, Chatham (2008) analyzed the level of complian-
ce with IFRS by French, Swedish, and Swiss companies 
which claimed to follow the international accounting 
standards, reaching insights regarding what might moti-
vate companies to meet or not the requirements of those 
standards. So, it is understood that the fact that there is 
a mismatch between what the standard establishes and 
what is observed by firms is perfectly “natural” at the in-
ception of a new standard. 
The index is based on Tsalavoutas, Evans and Smith 
(2010) and calculated according to the formula:
          1INDCOMB =
di
dj
i
n
j
m
1
1
∑
∑
=
=
Where di is the total number of items disclosed by the 
company (which was assigned the value “1”) and dj is the 
total number of items the company should have disclosed.
 3.2 Information sources
The identification of a business combination transac-
tion may be achieved by referring to the notes to the fi-
nancial statements published by companies listed on the 
stock exchange. As this procedure might require a long 
time, we sought an alternative to obtain the list of busi-
ness combinations that took place in 2010. Studies and 
analyses on merger and acquisition transactions conduc-
ted by entities such as the National Association of Invest-
ment Banks (ANBID) and PricewaterhouseCoopers and 
event reports from the Bloomberg database constitute 
sources of information on merger and acquisition tran-
sactions occurred in Brazil. 
The information available in the ranking of mergers 
and acquisitions of ANBID was crossed with informa-
tion from the Bloomberg database and the reports on 
mergers and acquisitions from PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
in order to obtain a list of companies involved in merger 
and acquisition transactions. In order to achieve confir-
mation that all business combination transactions had 
been listed, searches were performed in the documents 
filed by the companies in CVM the fiscal year 2010, on 
the documents entitled “Relevant Fact”, “Shareholders 
Meeting”, and “Notice to the Market”, by means of the 
system for Submission of Periodical and Occasional 
Information (IPE), which is a repository of documents 
that open capital companies are required to file in CVM. 
The search was performed by checking the period from 
January 1, 2010, to December 31, 2010. Document cate-
gories were those previously reported and the keywor-
ds adopted were “acquisition”, “combination”, “merger”, 
and “reorganization”. Transactions not considered as 
business combination were excluded. In the final list, 
40 companies involved in 76 mergers and acquisitions 
remained. Information regarding the disclosure of bu-
siness combination transactions were obtained from the 
financial statements of companies filed in CVM or those 
published in newspapers or on each company’s website. 
We also analyzed the reports of the independent audi-
tors, in order to check the existence of any reservation or 
emphasis involving the subject “business combinations” 
and there was no specific mention to this theme in the 
40 companies under analysis.
 3.3 Empirical model
To test the research hypotheses, we used multiple linear 
regression, in its cross-sectional type, by means of the or-
dinary least squares (OLS) method, having as dependent 
variable the disclosure index INDCOMB and explanatory 
variables related to the hypotheses described in items 3.4 
and 3.5, according to the general model:
INDCOMBi =  α + β1 * SIZE + β2 * GOODWILL 
+ β3 * DISPERSION + β4 * AUDIT + β5 * ADR_
LISTING +
j
k
1
∑
=
 CVji + εi  
          2
Where i represents the i-th company, SIZE, GOO-
DWILL, DISPERSION, AUDIT, and ADR_LISTING are 
proxies for variables related to the research hypotheses, CV 
are control variables, and εi represents the term unsystema-
tic error in the model. 
Based on the reviewed literature and the research hy-
potheses, we expect to identify a statistically significant 
relation between the dependent variable INDCOMB and 
the explanatory variables in the model that contribute to 
answer the following questions:
- Are large companies more concerned with the disclo-
sure of information on business combination tran-
sactions? 
- When companies recognize goodwill as a significant 
portion of the purchase price, do they tend to disclose 
less information on the transaction? 
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- Do companies with dispersed capital tend to disclose more 
information on business combination transactions? 
- Does audit firm size influence on the decision to 
disclose more information on business combination 
transactions? 
- Do companies participating in the U.S. stock market 
exchages  represent greater concern with disclosure on 
business combinations?
 3.4 Operational definition of variables
- SIZE represents the acquiring company size. In this stu-
dy, the proxy for firm size was the natural logarithm of 
total assets in the end of the reporting period. 
- GOODWILL is the ratio between the value recogni-
zed as goodwill (overprice for expected future profi-
tability) and the value of transferred consideration. 
The value regarded as transferred consideration was 
the amount delivered to assume control (which may 
have been in cash, capital instruments, or assumption 
of liabilities).
- DISPERSION is the variable to characterize capital 
dispersion. In this study, the variable DISPERSION 
was defined as the percentage of shares with voting 
rights held by non-controlling shareholders. The va-
lues  were obtained from the reference form filed by the 
company in CVM.
- AUDIT is the dummy variable indicating whether 
the audit service was provided by one of the big audit 
firms, the so-called Big Four (KPMG, Pricewaterhou-
seCoopers, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, and Ernest & 
Young). This is a dichotomous variable to which the 
value “1” has been assigned if the audit service was 
provided by one of the “Big Four” or “0” if the audit 
service was provided by other companies.
- ADR_LISTAGEM is the dummy variable indicating 
whether the acquiring company issues ADRs levels II 
and III, if it has issued the value “1” was assigned and 
“0” if it has not issued. Information was obtained from 
the website of CVM and the situation took into ac-
count in the end of the reporting period, i.e. for being 
regarded as ADR issuer the company should have its 
registration approved by CVM until 12/31/2010.
 3.5 Control variables
Control variables were selected based on previous surveys 
and the possible influence on the dependent (INDCOMB) 
and independent (SIZE, GOODWILL, DISPERSION, AU-
DIT, and ADR_LISTING) disclosure variables. Control varia-
bles (which are independent variables) are inserted into the 
model to remove their effects on the study results. The selected 
control variables and their proxies are described below.
- Relative_size: Málaga (2007) reports several researches 
that point out the use of the acquired company’s relative 
size as a control variable in regressions. The results of 
these studies suggest, according to Málaga (2007), that 
the acquired company’s relative size, among other fac-
tors, influenced on the acquirers’ short and long term 
return. However the results were not conclusive. In this 
study, relative size is defined as the ratio between the 
transaction value and the acquirer’s total assets (obtai-
ned from the consolidated financial statements) in the 
end of the reporting period.
- Listing status (listing): Kent and Stewart (2008) ar-
gue that a better corporate governance structure leads 
to better disclosure levels and they obtained empiri-
cal evidence with Australian companies that confirm 
this relation. Murcia and Santos (2009) found that 
companies from different sectors in the Brazilian 
Mercantile and Futures Exchange and the São Paulo 
Stock Exchange (BM&FBOVESPA) tend to have hi-
gher disclosure level. Companies listed in the New 
Market of BM&FBOVESPA indicate that they have 
the best corporate governance practices and, therefo-
re, should provide fuller financial data and annual re-
ports on internationally accepted standards. We used 
a dichotomous variable to indicate whether the ac-
quiring company was listed in the various segments 
of BM&FBOVESPA (New Market and Level II) up to 
12/31/2010.
- Operation sector (sector): In addition to the ac-
counting regulation issued by CVM some open ca-
pital companies are also subject to standards issued 
by government regulatory agencies, such as the 
National Electric Energy Agency (ANEEL) and the 
Central Bank of Brazil (BACEN). Murcia and Santos 
(2009) found that companies from the electric sec-
tor, subject to the standards of ANEEL, have higher 
disclosure level than the other companies. We used 
the dummy variable to indicate whether the company 
acted in sectors subject to the standards issued by 
ANEEL and BACEN. 
- Origin of the acquiring company (origin): According 
to Lanzana (2004), State companies may be motivated 
by having higher disclosure level on the market than 
their private counterparts in view of their “social role”. 
The researcher classified companies into three groups, 
according to their origin: state-owned, national priva-
te, and foreign private company. In this research, we 
used dummies indicating the origin of the acquiring 
company under analysis in Lanzana (2004).
 4 RESULTS
 4.1 Descriptive statistics
In addition to the disclosure index INDCOMB, calcu-
lated having equation (1) as a basis, we calculated the dis-
closure index for each information category, obtaining the 
results shown in Table 1:
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- Overall score: The average disclosure rate was 0.6026. 
We emphasize that this result was obtained through 
information that “theoretically” might be mandatorily 
disclosed, indicating that a significant part of the infor-
mation required by CPC 15 have not been disclosed. 
However, this result is not a matter of surprise, since it 
is consistent with other studies that also documented 
non-disclosure of mandatory information (see, for ins-
tance, Ayers et al., no prelo; Devalle & Rizzato, 2012).   
- Overall information score: The average rate 0.8538 in 
this category indicates that companies have disclosed 
overall information related to transactions in an ade-
quate way, this has been the highest individual score. It 
is observed that in this information category the disclo-
sure of owner information has not been required, some-
thing which may justify its high level.
- Score of information on allocation of transaction 
value for the assets: The information in this category 
refer to the book values  and fair values  of recognized 
assets acquired and liabilities assumed. The average rate 
0.5167, with a coefficient of variation of 0.6646 indicate 
low disclosure levels, with very big differences between 
the information provided by companies. 
- Score of information on contingent consideration 
agreements: Few companies have reported the existen-
ce of a contingent consideration agreement. The doubt 
is whether the small amount of companies reporting 
the existence of this agreement type is due to the fact 
that, actually, there are no agreements between buyer 
and seller or because of the former Brazilian accounting 
practices, which did not prescribe the disclose of this 
information.
- Score of information on recognition of contingent 
liabilities: This is one of the exceptions to CPC 25 – 
Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent As-
sets – in recognizing contingent assets and liabilities 
deriving from business combination. Few companies 
have recognized the existence of contingent liabilities 
deriving from combination. The rate 0.5944, with a co-
efficient of variation of 0.5607, indicate low disclosure 
level and a big difference between the companies that 
reported information in this category.
- Score of information on goodwill: Information on 
goodwill recognized in a business combination was 
very poor, as it may be evidenced by the low rate 0.4402. 
In addition, there are major differences between infor-
mation provided by companies, because the coefficient 
of variation was 0.5936. It is observed that there is still 
some conceptual confusion regarding overprice and 
goodwill at some companies. The most common is na-
ming goodwill as the difference between the value of 
transferred consideration and the net value of assets 
and liabilities. Concerning the qualitative factors that 
make up goodwill, generally companies just declared 
that the overprice for future expectation was grounded 
in a report prepared by a specialized company.  
- Score of information on transaction separate from 
combination: We did not identify any company that 
has reported a transaction separate from combination.
- Score of information on business combination achie-
ved in stages: Few companies reported that they held 
prior participation in acquired companies before acqui-
ring control.
- Score of financial information of the acquired 
company: The average rate 0.3167 indicates that 
companies had few required information. Additionally, 
there is a big difference between companies; some did 
not disclose any information and others disclosed all 
required information.
- Score of information on combination of operations 
occurring after the reporting period: Only 13 compa-
nies reported conducting a business combination tran-
saction after the reporting period. The information is 
contained in the item named subsequent events and, 
generally, does not meet the information requirements 
of CPC 15. The information disclosed was quite suc-
cinct.
- Score of information on changes in recognized values: 
Few companies have identified changes in values recog-
nized in the initial accounting. 
N/A – not available
Index Minimum Maximum Average Standard deviation Coefficient of variation
Overall score (INDCOMB) 0.2857 0.8519 0.6026 0.1675 0.2780
General information 0.5556 1 0.8538 0.1378 0.1614
Allocation of the transaction value 0 1 0.5167 0.3434 0.6646
Contingent consideration agreement 0.25 1 0.6786 0.3134 0.4618
Contingent liabilities 0 1 0.5944 0.3333 0.5607
Goodwill 0 1 0.4402 0.2613 0.5936
Transactions separate from combination N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Combination achieved in stages 0 0.6667 0.2778 0.2509 0.9032
Acquired company’s financial information 0 1 0.3167 0.3785 1.1951
Combination that occurred after the reporting period 0 1 0.7179 0.3561 0.4960
Changes in recognized assets and liabilities 0 1 0.4389 0.4064 0.9260
Table 1   Results of the descriptive statistics
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 4.2 Results of the empirical model
Preliminarily, we conducted a survey of the correlation 
between variables of the model, obtaining the results dis-
played in Table 2. 
We notice a significant positive correlation between the 
disclosure index and the independent variables relative size 
and audit firm, enabling evidence that the acquired com-
pany size and the audit firm influence on the disclosure of 
information on the business combination. 
The variable goodwill (percentage of goodwill in relation 
to the value of transferred consideration) expresses a negative 
correlation to the disclosure rate of INDCOMB, it seems to in-
dicate that a greater recognition of goodwill in relation to the 
transaction value leads companies to disclose a lower level of 
information, in line with what was observed by Shalev (2009). 
The correlation between the variable percentage of goodwill 
in relation to the transaction value and the total assets sho-
ws a negative sign, suggesting that smaller companies tend to 
recognize greater goodwill in the transaction. According to 
the observation of a negative correlation between the variable 
indicating participation in ADR programs and the percenta-
ge of goodwill identified in relation to the transaction value, 
companies that list their shares on American stock exchanges 
recognize lower goodwill in transactions. 
We used the statistical software Stata and the results are 
shown in Table 3.
 indcomb assets goodwill dispersion audit listing adr sector rel_size
indcomb 1.0000         
assets 0.0517 1.0000        
goodwill -0.0320 -0.2240 1.0000       
dispersion -0.0250 -0.1320 -0.0697 1.0000      
audit 0.3372 0.2200 0.3031 0.0997 1.0000     
listing 0.0936 -0.3910 0.1554 0.5362 0.0000 1.0000    
adr 0.0633 0.7000 -0.3932 -0.1813 0.1400 -0.4042 1.0000   
sector 0.0298 0.2597 -0.1450 -0.0282 0.0949 -0.0548 0.1462 1.0000  
rel_size 0.3344 -0.2890 0.0952 0.1895 -0.0047 0.2550 -0.2121 0.2931 1.0000
legend:
indcomb = index of business combination INDCOMB 
assets =  natural logarithm of total assets
goodwill =  ratio between recognized goodwill and the value of transferred consideration 
dispersion =  percentage of common shares held by non-controlling shareholders
audit = dummy indicating that the audit firm is one of the Big Four 
listing = dummy indicating that the company is listed on the new Market or on BM&FBovespa level 2
adr = dummy indicating that the company issues ADRs      
sector = dummy indicating that the company operates in the financial or electric sector 
rel_size =  ratio between the transaction value and the the acquiring company’s total assets 
Table 2   Correlation matrix
 Coef. Std. Err t P> |t| [95% conf. interval]
assets .0152439 .0201705 0.76 0.456 -.0258942 .0563819
goodwill -.1084677 .0695888 -1.56 0.129 -.2503951 .0334597
dispersion -.1967892 .1290954 -1.52 0.138 -.460081 .0665026
audit .245981 .0921305 2.67 0.012 .0580797 .4338824
listing .0740528 .0732194 1.01 0.320 -.0752791 .2233848
adr -.0331007 .1049792 -0.32 0.755 -.2472071 .1810058
sector -.1391803 .1058138 -1.32 0.198 -.3549889 .0766283
rel_size .4922631 .1800548 2.73 0.010 .1250388 .8594874
_cons .0865779 .4391994 0.20 0.845 -.8091751 .9823309
Number of observations 40
F statistics 1.98
P value 0.0827
R squared 0.3383
Adjusted R squared 0.1675
Table 3   Results of regression
Determining Factors of the Level of Disclosure of Information on Business Combinations with the Entry into Force of the Accounting Standard CPC 15
R. Cont. Fin. – USP, São Paulo, v. 25, n. 66, p. 267-280, set./out./nov./dez. 2014 277
We can notice that the model with all independent va-
riables included has no statistical significance at 95% con-
fidence level, according to F test, and there are even proble-
ms of multicollinearity between some variables, such as, for 
instance, adr and assets. However, as the variables audit and 
relative size have proved to be significant, then, the stepwise 
procedure was executed to remove from the model statisti-
cally non-significant variables and check if they result in a 
model that demonstrates explanatory power. Thus, executing 
the procedure, we obtained the results displayed in Table 4.  
The resulting model is significant (F statistics = 0.0086), 
therefore, if rejecting the null hypothesis that all covariates 
have coefficients equal to zero. The final model shows as sta-
tistically significant variables the audit firm size, the relative 
company size, and the intercept, at the confidence interval of 
95%. Based on multicollinearity test by using the variation in-
flation factor (VIF) test, it was found that the VIFs found are 
below 3 According to Gujarati (2006), multicollinearity pro-
blems are considered when VIF above 10 are observed. The-
refore, in the final model, based on the VIF test, there are no 
multicollinearity problems among the explanatory variables. 
The model has indicated a heteroscedasticity pro-
blem of waste in the Breush-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test. 
However, according to Wooldridge (2006), heteroce-
dasticity does not cause bias or inconsistency in the re-
gression coefficients or in R², revealing problems only 
in t statistics. Wooldridge (2006) suggests as a correcti-
ve procedure for this problem using a robust t statistics 
concerning heteroscedasticity. Running up a robust re-
gression in Stata, with only the audit explanatory varia-
bles and relative size, we obtained the results displayed 
in Table 5.
In fact it is observed that the model remains statistically 
significant with no change in its explanatory power. The co-
efficient values  were not changed, only on the t statistics for 
each regressor.
 5 CONCLUSIONS
This paper sought to analyze the level of disclosure of 
information on business combinations and the factors that 
influenced on the company’s decision to disclose informa-
tion on these transactions, in the year that CPC 15 entered 
into force.
To test the hypotheses, independent variables cited 
in the meta-analysis by Ahmed and Courtis (1999) and 
control variables reported in the literature were used. It 
is noticed that the disclosure index was low. This may 
be attributed to the fact that 2010 was the first year of 
 Coef. Std. Err t P> |t| [95% conf. interval]
audit .1867982 .0797242 2.34 0.025 .0252616 .3483348
rel_size .3547538 .1526599 2.32 0.026 .0454355 .6640721
_cons .3995629 .077173 5.18 0.000 .2431956 .5559302
Number of observations 40
F statistics 5.42
P value 0.0086
R squared 0.2266
Adjusted R squared 0.1848
Table 4   Results regression by using the stepwise procedure
 Coef. Std. Err t P> |t| [95% conf. interval]
audit .1867982 .0536262 3.48 0.001 .0781413 .2954551
rel_size .3547538 .1171841 3.03 0.004 .1173163 .5921913
_cons .3995629 .0478862 8.34 0.000 .3025362 .4965896
Number of observations 40
F statistics 13.08
P value 0.0001
R squared 0.2266
Table 5   Results of robust regression
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the Accounting Standard CPC 15 – and, thus, preparers 
and auditors were not, yet, well prepared to apply the 
standard. 
Regarding the acquiring company’s size, it was not con-
cluded that larger companies disclose more information 
on business combinations, a result that is different from 
that found in most international surveys on disclosure, but 
in line with what was found by Glaum and Street (2003), 
Street and Bryant (2000), and Street and Gray (2002). It is 
emphasized that this study refers to a specific dimension 
of disclosure related to information on business combina-
tions, therefore, with different characteristics when compa-
red to other studies cited on disclosure. Nevertheless, this is 
information disclosure and, thus, we compared the results 
to other surveys regarding disclosure. 
On the other hand, corroborating what was observed 
in the analysis of the correlation between variables, it 
was confirmed that the control variable relative size sho-
wed statistical significance with a positive coefficient, 
as observed by Málaga (2007), indicating that acquiring 
firms are concerned about disclosing more information 
on business combinations the higher the value of the 
transaction in relation to the total of their own assets, i.e. 
when investment is significant. This seems to be due to 
the concern of acquiring companies with the influence 
of the acquired company on its results. 
The variable recognized goodwill in relation to trans-
ferred consideration value had no statistical significant, 
unlike what was found by Shalev (2007). A possible ex-
planation for the rejection of this hypothesis is that the 
calculation of goodwill is usually done with a high dose of 
arbitrariness or even influenced by tax legislation. We can 
also notice that, in a large part of transactions, goodwill 
was computed as the difference between the amount paid 
and its book value and this difference was entirely justi-
fied as expected future profitability. 
The hypothesis that firms with greater capital disper-
sion disclose more information on business combinations 
was not confirmed, contrary to what was reported by 
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) and Raffournier (1995). A hy-
pothesis for the result is that even with capital dispersion, 
shareholder agreements ensure control of these compa-
nies by a controller or a control group, according to a stu-
dy conducted by Gorga (2008), and, in the presence of 
control concentration, disclosure would not be required. 
The results indicate that audit firm size influences 
on the level of disclosure of information on business 
combination, as observed by Ahmad et al. (2003). Large 
international audit companies, familiar with the requi-
rements of IFRS 3 at the international level, apply this 
knowledge to Brazil, influencing on the disclosure of 
information on a business combination undertaken by 
audited companies. 
Finally, we did not confirm the hypothesis that the le-
vel of disclosure on business combinations is influenced 
by acquiring company’s participation in ADR programs. 
Murcia and Santos (2009) found different results. A justi-
fication for the different result is that the companies used 
for analysis were different. Murcia and Santos (2009) used 
the 100 largest companies listed on BOVESPA, which pu-
blished financial statements for the fiscal year 2007 and 
this study analyzed all companies having shares traded on 
the BM&FBOVESPA in 2010 that reported to acquired 
the stock control of other companies. Furthermore, the 
metrics used by Murcia and Santos (2009) to calculate the 
disclosure level was based on voluntarily disclosed infor-
mation, whereas this study used the compulsory disclo-
sure items defined by CPC 15. Therefore, although both 
analyze the influence of issuing ADRs on disclosure, they 
are not similar surveys. 
The results obtained by this survey provide a contri-
bution to the studies that have been recently conducted 
in Brazil, related to the evaluation of the accounting in-
formation disclosure levels after the adoption of IFRS 
and CPCs. Furthermore, it provides evidence for the 
specific analysis of companies that undertook business 
combinations. These transactions, as discussed in the 
introduction, moved large volumes of resources and 
users of accounting information are directly affected by 
the outcomes of such transactions. It also contributes to 
international studies related to accounting information 
disclosure, insofar as it provides empirical evidence on 
impacts deriving from the adoption of IFRS in Brazil. 
The findings also contribute to the literature in the field 
by providing new evidence on the phenomenon of dis-
closure, studied both internationally and in Brazil and 
from a very specific perspective, the disclosure of infor-
mation on business combinations. 
Thus, in terms of practical consequences for such users, 
through the positive relation obtained between the infor-
mation disclosure level and the audit firm size, it is expec-
ted that companies audited by the Big Four provide a rather 
transparent information to the market. On the other hand, 
the positive relation between the disclosure level and the 
acquiring company’s relative size draws attention to the as-
pect of transaction relevance. 
Another aspect that draws attention refers to the low 
disclosure level itself (and consistent with other studies 
addressing mandatory disclosure), since the index was 
obtained by checking information disclosure on busi-
ness combinations considered as compulsory. Although 
recognizing that the level of disclosure of such informa-
tion has not been high due to the fact that this legislation 
constitutes a novelty, if there is not an active role on the 
part of regulators, we are at risk of do not move forward 
to improve the information disclose level, since a stan-
dard without enforcement may be understood only as a 
suggestion. The results and conclusions of this study had 
some limitations. The first is that the disclosure of in-
formation on business combinations was limited to the 
fiscal year 2010, which was the onset of the application 
of CPC 15. As they were the early financial statements 
where compliance with the requirements of CPC 15 
were compulsory, it is reasonable to assume that errors 
might be found in the financial statements. It is belie-
ved that surveys addressing a broader period of stability 
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and the standards’ estability could provide the disclosure 
level with robustness and knowledge on the evolution. 
This could help regulators to evaluate the need for en-
forcement. On the other hand, this does not invalidate 
this survey, because it portrays the situation observed 
when CPC 15 entered into force. Another analysis that 
could be suggested might be a comparison between the 
situation before and after CPC 15. However, taking into 
account that the requirement to disclose this kind of in-
formation prior to the adoption of CPC 15 was much 
lower, so, such a comparison could not be feasible. 
The second limitation is related to the construction of 
the disclosure index INDCOMB. Although such a cons-
truction has been based on Shalev (2009) and on the re-
quirements of CPC 15, this involves the creation of a not 
directly observable construct. In addition, there is the fact 
that, in the content analysis of financial statements to pre-
pare the disclosure index INDCOMB, the researcher used 
a considerable amount of opinion. Finally, it is worth hi-
ghlighting the limitations of the econometric model em-
ployed, since it is restricted to a few independent variables 
that the researcher considered as relevant to explain the 
level of disclosure of information on business combina-
tion. The choice of variables was based on previous stu-
dies and on the need to construct proxies to analyze the 
hypotheses. 
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